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Chapter 12

United States of America
Erik Gerding*
1

Introduction

This chapter addresses the liability of directors under laws in the United States
of America for misconduct or illegal actions taken by a corporation. The reader
may ﬁnd this liability to be a rare phenomenon when compared to the liability
faced by directors in the other jurisdictions surveyed in this volume. Unlike some
jurisdictions in the world, US federal and state laws do not impose broad duties
on directors that would hold these individuals generally liable by virtue of their
directorial position for all violations of the law or harmful acts to third parties
committed by the corporations they oversee.
Instead, potential director liability for corporate misconduct, where it does exist
in the United States, ﬂows along four narrower legal channels. First, a director may
be liable to creditors for violations of rather mechanical state corporation statutes1
designed to protect creditors. These violations include liability for obligations of a
*
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School of Law, University of New Mexico; Fellow, Department of Business Law and
Taxation, Monash University. The author wishes to thank Eileen Gauna, Denise Fort and
Kelly Strader for advice on environmental law aspects of this manuscript and Rose Bryan,
and Ernesto Longa and the UNM Law Library staff for research assistance. All views and any
errors, however, are solely the responsibility of the author. The author can be contacted at
gerding@law.unm.edu.
In the United States, corporate law has generally been a matter of state not federal law, but
exceptions abound; most notably, the Sarbanes Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002), represented a new involvement of federal law and regulation in issues of corporate
governance. For a sampling of different scholarly views on the Act’s ‘federalization’ of
corporate governance, see S.M. Bainbridge ‘The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law’
(2003) 26 Regulation, 32; and R.B. Ahdieh, ‘From “Federalization” to “Mixed Governance”
in Corporate Law: a Defense of Sarbanes Oxley’ (2005) 53 Buffalo Law Review, 721.
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defectively incorporated entity and prohibitions on corporations paying dividends
to, or repurchasing shares from, shareholders when the corporation has insufﬁcient
capital.2
This liability contrasts with the second source of liability for directors – when
a court pierces a corporation’s veil. Whereas the ﬁrst form of liability involves
statutory, mechanical and rather uninteresting legal questions for courts (e.g. was a
corporation properly formed, or were payments to shareholders made from proper
speciﬁed sources of capital), piercing the corporate veil represents common law3
in its most inchoate and perplexing form. US courts base decisions to pierce the
corporate veil on a multitude of factors and employ rhetorical devices such as
inquiring whether the corporation was the ‘alter ego’ of a defendant, that are more
conclusive than explanatory in nature. The muddied analytical foundation of veil
piercing frustrates predictions about when courts will impose the severe sanction of
disregarding the limited liability protections of the corporate form. Yet, US courts
remain reluctant to pierce a corporation’s veil in general, and instances in which a
court has pierced the veil to ﬁnd a director or corporate ofﬁcer liable, rather than a
corporate or individual shareholder, are rarer still.4
But, directors may be liable for tortious acts by a corporation even absent veil
piercing under the third channel of liability: according to principles of agency law,
directors are directly liable for those torts committed by the corporation in which
the director participated.5 These principles hold that an agent of a corporation who
commits or participates in a tort may not escape liability merely because the agent
was acting on behalf of a corporation.6
This direct liability/agency/participation theory has also inﬂuenced the
interpretation and drafting of many federal and state statutes. Thus, directors may
also incur liability for corporate statutory violations in which they participated
2
3

4
5
6

See Part 2 below.
Law in the United States, like England, is originally based on the common law. The US
Constitution, however, is the supreme law of the land and the source of all federal statutes.
US Const. art. VI, cl. 2. The principal sources of law in the United States are the Constitution,
federal statutes, federal administrative regulations, state constitutions, state statutes, state
administrative regulations, municipal ordinances and regulations and common law, including
case law. For a historical introduction to US law, see L. M. Friedman, A History of American
Law (3rd edn, New York, Touchstone, 2005).
The interaction of common and statutory law is one of interesting subtexts of this
chapter. In interpreting whether a statute imposes liability on directors (or ofﬁcers),
US courts face the choice of whether silences and ambiguities in the statutory text
should be interpreted so as not to conﬂict with common law norms or whether such an
interpretation would frustrate a statute with broad remedial purposes. See notes 98–100
below and accompanying text.
See n. 31 below and accompanying text.
Some courts and commentators have erroneously conﬂated this agency theory of liability
with veil piercing. See notes 113 and 125 below.
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01.
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provided that the statute in question at least includes individuals in the deﬁnition
of ‘persons’ who may be found liable. Some federal and state statutes go a step
further and speciﬁcally include directors in the list of potentially liable persons.7
With respect to either a statutory violation or a common law tort by a corporation,
the agency theory raises the question of how direct and extensive is a director’s
participation before he or she incurs personal liability. In a number of statutory
contexts, courts have ruled that directors (and ofﬁcers) must directly participate for
liability to attach.8
However, another doctrinal strain might hold directors (and ofﬁcers) liable for
corporate violations of certain statutes if the directors merely have the ability to
control the corporate conduct that leads to the violation. Directors would be liable
under this fourth theory, labelled the ‘responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine,’ even
absent their participation in, or, in some cases, knowledge of, a statutory violation.9
Many courts have rejected applying this doctrine to new statutes without clear
statutory language, due to, among other reasons, constitutional concerns about due
process of law for individual defendants.10 Other courts have narrowed the scope
of the doctrine by, inter alia, requiring that a director (or ofﬁcer) have control over
a speciﬁc corporate activity that violated a statute as opposed to general power
to oversee a corporation in order for liability to attach.11 Narrowing the scope of
liability brings this doctrine and the interpretation of statutes, more in line with
the common law agency theory of liability, but at the cost of circumscribing the
remedial nature of statutes and lowering the deterrence effect on directors.12
This chapter proceeds as follows. Part 2 brieﬂy discusses liability of directors
under the ﬁrst legal channel described above, i.e. liability for violations of various
mechanical provisions of state corporation statutes designed to protect creditors.
Part 3 then brieﬂy outlines the piercing the corporate veil doctrine in the United
States, particularly as it applies to directors. Part 4 then analyzes the direct liability/
agency/participation theory for director liability and looks at how legislatures
and courts have applied this theory to statutory violations. Part 5 analyzes the
development of the responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine in the United States.
Part 6 provides a case study of one of the most important yet confusing federal
statutes that imposes potential massive liability on directors – the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (‘CERCLA’).13 An
analysis of case law under CERCLA demonstrates not only how courts easily
confuse and conﬂate veil piercing with agency theories, but, moreover, how statutes
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

See n. 56 below and accompanying text.
See notes 63, 65, and 105 below and accompanying text.
See Part 5 below.
See Part 7.1 below.
See Parts 5 and 6 below.
See Part 7.2 below.
42 United States Code §§ 9601–9675 (2008).
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and their judicial interpretations have often deﬁed easy categorization into either
the third channel of liability – agency theories – or the fourth – the responsible
corporate ofﬁcer doctrine.
Part 7 then concludes by summarizing themes in the previous Parts and
attempting to answer the questions of why. The question is twofold: why certain
statutes and legal doctrines impose liability on directors while others do not, and
why director liability is relatively uncommon in the United States compared to other
jurisdictions surveyed in this volume. In order to accomplish this, Part 7 outlines
some of the principle policy considerations behind US laws that hold or refuse to
hold directors liable for corporate misconduct. In particular, Part 7 analyzes how
the rules on director liability create a perverse disincentive for directors to actively
monitor and seek out legal violations.
Part 7.1 brieﬂy notes due process concerns and normative arguments for and
against director liability. Part 7.2 ﬁrst offers a public choice explanation for the
structure of US laws that lead to the rarity of director liability. It then provides a
broad brush analysis of certain efﬁciency considerations for director liability rules,
including the effects of director liability on deterrence of misconduct, delegation
within a corporation, and the market for directors. Part 7.3 explores another
economic consideration for director liability, risk-spreading, and analyzes the
effects of insurance and indemniﬁcation of directors by the corporation as allowed
under US corporate law. Part 7.4 investigates whether corporate law and securities
law counter the perverse disincentive created by director liability rules with respect
to not policing corporate misconduct. Part 7.4 concludes that the ﬁduciary duties of
directors serve as only the mildest corrective to this disincentive, but securities law
liability for directors, including controversial provisions of the federal Sarbanes
Oxley Act, may prove a more effective counterweight.
But, before delving into this chapter, it is important to note potential sources of
director liability on which this chapter does not focus; this chapter does not address
the liability of directors to shareholders or to the corporation itself. Accordingly,
this chapter does not discuss liability for breaches of the ﬁduciary duties directors
owe to shareholders. Likewise, the chapter does not address the liability of directors
when US law extends ﬁduciary duties to creditors while a corporation is insolvent.14
14

For an article summarizing these ﬁduciary duties to creditors and arguing that they should
be triggered upon ﬁling of a formal bankruptcy petition rather than upon ‘insolvency’, see
H.T.C. Hu and J.L. Westbrook, ‘Abolition of the Corporate Duty to Creditors’ (2007) 107
Columbia Law Review, 1321.
Director liability for ﬁduciary duties to creditors has become a heated topic, as prominent
and controversial judicial opinions have held that director may begin owing ﬁduciary duties
to creditors when a corporation approaches insolvency but has not yet become insolvent.
See, e.g. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp. 1991 WL
277613 (Del.Ch. 30 December 1991) (unpublished opinion), reprinted in (1992) 17 Delaware
Journal of Corporate Law, 1099. See also P.M. Jones and K.H. Harris, ‘Chicken Little Was
Wrong (Again): Perceived Trends in the Delaware Corporate Law of Fiduciary Duties and
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Nevertheless, the extension of ﬁduciary duties to creditors during a corporation’s
insolvency may represent the functional equivalent of laws in other jurisdictions in
the world that hold directors liable for a corporation trading during insolvency.
For the same reason, this chapter does not delve into director liability to
shareholders under federal and state securities laws. However, in Part 7.3, this
chapter does discuss the federal securities laws that impose responsibilities on
directors to monitor corporate misconduct.

2 Violations of State Corporation Statutes
Other than liabilities that directors voluntarily assume when they personally
guarantee obligations of a corporation, the most direct source of director liability
comes from mechanical provisions in state corporation statutes designed to protect.
Examples of these forms of individual liability for directors include the following:
(1) obligations incurred by directors ostensibly on behalf of a
corporation either before incorporation or in the case of a defective
incorporation;15
(2) state corporations statutes that impose liability on directors for ultra
vires acts by a corporation (i.e. acts not within those powers of a
corporation speciﬁed in its articles or certiﬁcate of incorporation);16
(3) state corporations statutes that hold directors liable to creditors for
authorizing the payment of dividends to shareholders or the redemption
of stock if the corporation has insufﬁcient capital;17
(4) state corporation statutes that prohibit certain loans to directors;18 and
(5) state corporations statutes that prohibit dissolution of a corporation
unless provisions have been made for obligations of the corporation.19

15

16
17

18
19

Standing in the Zone of Insolvency’ (2007) 16 Journal of Bankruptcy Law & Practice, 2
Art. 2.
See, e.g. Daniel A. Pouwels & Associates, Inc. v. Fiumara, 233 So.2d 16 (La. App. 4 Cir.
1970) (ofﬁcers and directors liable for debts incurred before incorporation); Murphy v.
Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah App. 1994)(State corporation statute imposes liability on all
Crosland
persons who act on behalf of a corporation that has not been properly incorporated or that has
been suspended).
For example, 8 Del. C. § 124(2) (2008).
For example, the Delaware General Corporations Law holds those directors who wilfully or
negligently violate the statute’s prohibitions on declaring and paying dividends or redeeming
or repurchasing stock unless the corporation has sufﬁcient capital liable to the corporation
and creditors. 8 Del. C. §§ 160, 173, 174 (2008). See also New York Business Corporations
Law §§ 510, 513, 719(a)(1–3) (2008).
For example, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law, §§ 714, 719(a)(4)(2008).
Ibid. § 719(a)(3) (2008) (holding directors jointly and severally liable to the corporation for
the beneﬁt of shareholders and creditors for distributing assets to shareholders after dissolution
‘without paying or adequately providing for all known liabilities of the corporation’).
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All of these forms of liability in this Part 2 arise from a fairly straightforward
judicial application of statutory provisions. Yet the mechanical nature of these rules
means that directors may sidestep liability fairly easily. For example, to avoid liability
before proper incorporation, directors need only wait until the fairly simple steps of
incorporation are taken before entering into contracts on behalf of the corporation.
Directors face no risk from a corporation committing an ultra vires act if the articles
of incorporation merely state that the corporation has all powers permitted by law.20
Many statutes that restrict the company from paying dividends to, or repurchasing
shares from, shareholders, except out of certain sources of capital, also give the
directors signiﬁcant leeway in setting the level of that capital by changing the par
value of shares or determining what portion of shares issued for consideration other
than cash, shall constitute capital.21 Finally, creditor-friendly statutory restrictions
on dissolution are not triggered if the corporation never formally dissolves.
Some states may have more restrictive corporation statutes that are more
protective of creditors. But, it must be underscored that, in the United States,
businesses have great latitude in choosing the state under whose laws they wish
to incorporate.22 This has led many larger businesses to choose to incorporate in
jurisdictions, such as Delaware, whose corporation statutes are less restrictive and
more protective of management. This federalism in US corporate law has also
generated a longstanding debate over whether the competition among states to
develop laws that attract incorporations leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ or a ‘race to
the top.’23

3 Veil Piercing and Director Liability
By contrast with those mechanical provisions of corporation states, veil piercing
is an equitable, common law doctrine, which presents judges both great ﬂexibility
and amorphous standards.24 When judges pierce the veil in the United States,
they disregard both the legal status of a corporation as an entity separate from its
shareholders – or, in some cases, from its ofﬁcers or directors – and the limited
20

21
22

23

24

Model Business Corporation Act, § 3.04, Historical Background Note 1 (‘Most of this [ultra
vires] litigation was avoidable in the sense that appropriate provisions in the original articles
of incorporation or appropriate amendments to them broadening the scope of the purpose of
the corporation would have validated the transactions in question’) .
See e.g. 8 Del. C. § 154 (2008).
For example, a business that conducts all of its operations and has its headquarters in one state
can incorporate under the laws of another state. See F.A. Gevurtz, Corporation Law (St. Paul,
Minn. West, 2000) § 1.2.
For an analysis of this debate, see L.A. Bebchuk, ‘Federalism and the Corporation: the
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law’ (1992) 105 Harvard Law Review,
1435.
R.B. Thompson, ‘Piercing the Veil: Is Common Law the Problem?’ (2005) 37 Connecticut
Law Review, 619.

GERDING: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

307

liability concomitant with that separation.25 The defendants thus lose the principal
beneﬁt of the corporate form – the limitation of their liability for the obligations of
the corporation to the amount of capital the defendants contributed.26
Scholars have labelled veil piercing as the most heavily litigated issue in all of
US corporate law,27 and have surmised that it occurs more frequently in the United
States that in other countries.28 Even so, scholars have also compared the risk of a
corporation having the limited liability of its shareholders retracted to the chance of
a person being struck by lightning.29 Publicly traded corporations have not suffered
veil piercing.30
Moreover, empirical research demonstrates that equity owners – particularly
parent corporations rather than natural person shareholders – and not directors or
ofﬁcers, represent the overwhelming majority of the targets of veil piercing.31 It is
true that cases in some states have held that a defendant need not own shares in a
corporation to be held liable for a corporation’s obligations under veil piercing.32
There are also cases in which veil piercing doctrines subjected to liability directors

25
26
27
28
29

30
31

32

For an excellent empirical survey of veil piercing in the United States, see R.B. Thompson,
‘Piercing the Corporate Veil: an Empirical Study’ (1991) 76 Cornell Law Review, 1036.
S.B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil (New York, C. Boardman, 1991), § 1.01.
See n. 25 above at 1036.
See n. 24 above at 619.
F.H. Easterbrook and D.R. Fischel, ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ (1985) 52
University of Chicago Law Review, 89, 109 (characterizing veil piercing as ‘rare, severe and
unprincipled’).
See n. 25 above at 1039.
For an empirical survey of 1,600 veil piercing cases, see n. 25 at 1058; F.H. O’Neil and
R.B. Thompson, O’Neal’s Close Corporation: Law and Practice (3rd edn, New York,
Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1992) § 111 n. 2. Professor Thompson reports that in only ten
of the subset of cases in his survey not involving piercing between parent and subsidiary
corporations did a plaintiff seek to hold a natural person liable for participating in the tort.
In only 15 additional cases, all involving close corporations, did plaintiffs seek to hold a
natural person liable even if he or she was not directly involved in the tort. Moreover, suits
against natural persons were even rarer in cases in which the defendant corporation was not
insolvent. See R.B. Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability
of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ (1994) 47 Vanderbilt Law Review, 1,
10–11.
Non-shareholder defendants could be liable under veil piercing when they exercise extensive
control over a corporation such that courts deem them to be the true owners of the corporation
under the doctrine of ‘equitable ownership’. See, e.g. Freeman v. Complex Computing, 119
F.3d 1044, 1051 (2nd Cir. 1997); Lally v. Catskill Airways, Inc. 198 A.D.2d 643 at 645, 603
N.Y.S.2d 619 at 621 (3rd Dep’t 1993); In re MacDonald
MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326 at 332–33 (D. Mass.
1990).
A small minority of cases go a step further and label stock ownership as merely one factor
that courts look at in deciding whether the veil should be pierced. E.g. Angelo Tomasso, Inc. v.
Armor Construction & Paving, Inc., 187 Conn. 544 at 556–57, 446 A.2d 406 at 412 (1982).
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who were not also shareholders.33 But, again, these represent a small and relatively
uninteresting fraction of the total body of veil piercing case law.34
Veil piercing arises most frequently in the context of either liability of a parent
corporation for a subsidiary or a closely held corporation in which the controlling
(or sole) shareholder also serves as an ofﬁcer and director.35 This frequent overlap
of status in close corporations makes it difﬁcult to untangle case law and articulate
conditions for when director status alone creates a veil piercing risk. There is nothing
to suggest that a different legal standard applies to directors other than the general
standards courts apply in all veil piercing cases.
However, it is difﬁcult to articulate even the general standards for veil piercing.
American scholars have lamented the deep theoretical incoherence of piercing the
corporate veil case law.36 This incoherence stems in part from the fact that veil
piercing, like most of corporate law in the country, is a creature of state law and
therefore differs in each of the 50 states. Furthermore, the fact that veil piercing is,
again, a matter of common law further complicates the analysis.37
The common law approach has led many courts to base decisions to pierce or
not to pierce based on multi-factor tests without articulating the weight given to
individual factors.38 Some of the more common factors cited by courts include the
following:39
(1) was the corporation the ‘alter ego’ or ‘mere instrumentality’ of the
plaintiff?;40
33
34
35

36

37

38
39
40

For example, Macaluso v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251 (Ill. App. 1981) (director of non-proﬁt
corporation may be found liable under veil piercing).
Cf. n. 31 above.
Thompson, n. 25 above at 1047–48. Cf. O’Neal and Thompson n. 31 above at § 1.08 at
32 (describing how closely-held corporations concentrate both control and ownership/riskbearing in one set of actors, namely shareholder managers).
For example, Easterbrook and Fischel, n. 29 above; F.A. Gevurtz, ‘Piercing Piercing: an
Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate
Veil’ (1997) 76 Oregon Law Review, 853.
Thompson, n. 24 above (analyzing whether the fact that veil piercing is a matter of common
law contributes to its theoretical incoherency). Texas represents one partial exception to a
pure common law approach to veil piercing, in that the legislature of that state at least codiﬁed
which factors cannot be used by a court to pierce a Texas corporation’s veil. See Tex. Bus.
Corp. Act Art. 2.21 (2008).
Gevurtz, n. 36 above at 856–58 (criticizing this ‘template approach’).
For an empirical study showing the frequency that each of these individual factors was
mentioned in cases in which courts pierced the veil, see n. 25 above at 1064–68.
Under this test, if there is a sufﬁcient ‘unity of interest’ among the shareholder (or, in some
cases ofﬁcer or director) and the corporation, such that a corporation is merely the ‘alter
ego’ of the individual, a court may pierce the veil and allow the plaintiff to look to the assets
of the shareholder (or ofﬁcer or director). The canonical case for this test is Walkovsky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414; 276 N.Y.S.2d 585; 223 N.E.2d. 6 (1966). Scholars have criticized
this factor for representing more of a rhetorical conclusion to whether defendants are liable
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defendant’s ‘domination and control’ of the corporation;41
undercapitalization of the corporation;42
fraud or misrepresentation by the defendant;43
failure to observe corporate formalities; 44 and
commingling of defendant’s assets with the corporation.45

Many courts employ additional factors in deciding whether to pierce the veil of
a subsidiary corporation and hold the parent corporation liable. These additional
factors include whether the two corporations have overlapping management
(including ofﬁcers and directors), shareholders, ofﬁces or business operations.46
American scholars have criticized courts for failing to apply this grab bag of
factors in a coherent manner and to offer a clear rationale for why some defendants
are held liable for a corporation’s obligations while others are able to take advantage
of the corporate form and externalize the costs of operations onto creditors. In
particular, the messy ad hoc application of the loose veil piercing factors does not
clearly distinguish between contract creditors, who may have been able to bargain
to avoid the loss created by a corporation, and involuntary tort creditors, who had
no opportunity to bargain.47

41
42

43

44

45
46

47

than a reasoned explanation of when the veil will be pierced. Courts also employ similar
rhetorical devices such as labelling the corporation as a ‘shell’ or ‘sham.’ Gevurtz, n. 36 above
at 855.
E.g. Zaist v.Olson, A.2d 552, at 558 (Conn. 1967).
Some courts look to whether the corporation was inadequately capitalized when compared to
probable liabilities, but also ﬁnd that undercapitalization alone is not a sufﬁcient justiﬁcation
for piercing. R.C. Clark, Corporate Law (New York, Aspen Law and Business, 1986) § 2.4.1.
This, of course, raises the question of how to measure undercapitalization.
For example, Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying
Illinois law). In several states, this fraud test is diluted and a plaintiff need merely show that
failing to pierce the veil would promote ‘inequity.’ See, e.g. Kinney Shoe Corporation v.
Polan, 939 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying West Virginia law).
Courts often base their veil piercing decision in part on the failure of defendants to follow
formalities in operating a corporation, such as holding required meetings of directors and
shareholders, keeping records and ﬁling annual reports. See J.D. Cox and T.L. Hazen, Cox &
Hazen on Corporations (New York, Aspen, 2003) § 7.09.
Ibid.
For an in-depth exploration of the law of piercing in the context of parents and subsidiaries,
see P.I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporations Under Statutory Law of General Application (New York, Little Brown,1989).
For example, Gevurtz, n. 36 above at 858–59 (surveying arguments on why veil piercing
should distinguish between contract and tort creditors); R.W. Hamilton, ‘The Corporate
Entity’ (1971) 49 Texas Law Review, 979, 984 (1971) (arguing for applying this distinction to
rationalize veil piercing).
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Direct Liability/Agency/Participation Theories

The rarity of veil piercing liability does not immunize directors, as the common
law principles of agency present a distinct source of liability for directors.48 Under
common law, directors are liable for torts that they commit or participate in,
even if they are acting on behalf of a corporation.49 Similarly, acting on behalf
of a corporation does not insulate directors and ofﬁcers from criminal liability
for crimes they commit.50 By contrast, directors and agents of a corporation are
liable for contracts they enter into on behalf of the corporation only when they
do not disclose the identity of their principal, i.e. they do not tell the contractual
counterparty that they are contracting on behalf of a corporation or specify the
identity of the corporation.51
Under this theory, derived from agency law on tort liability, courts have found
that directors may be held liable for participating in corporate torts and crimes in a
range of contexts, ranging from misappropriation of trade secrets52 to common law
fraud and conspiracy.53
This theory of director liability extends beyond common law to statutory
violations by a corporation. In interpreting a range of federal statutes, federal courts
have repeatedly found that individuals, including directors, ofﬁcers, and employees,
can be criminally and civilly liable for statutory violations committed for the beneﬁt
of the corporation.54 But, for a director to be liable, the statute must, at a minimum,
48

49

50
51

52
53
54

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01 summarizes the common law rules thus:
An agent is subject to liability to a third party harmed by the agent’s tortious conduct.
Unless an applicable statute provides otherwise, an actor remains subject to liability
although the actor acts as an agent or an employee, with actual or apparent authority,
or within the scope of employment.
The ofﬁcial comments to that section clarify that that rule applies equally to agents of a
corporation regardless of whether a court has or has not pierced the corporation’s veil.
Restatement (Third) of Agency § 7.01(d). Case law clariﬁes that directors are liable for torts
in which they participate. See n. 52–53 below. Comment (d) to the Restatement clariﬁes
that directors are liable, this despite the fact that they technically may not be agents of a
corporation. Cf. Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of
Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 8.
E.g. Dawson v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84 at 101–02 (Ariz. App. Div. 2007); see also cases
cited in W.M. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations, Vol. 3A (Eagan, Minn.
Thomson West, 2007), § 1137.
Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 7.
Compare Restatement (Third) Agency § 6.01 (agent is not party to a contract when the
principal is disclosed unless otherwise agreed) with §§ 6.02 and 6.03 (agent is liable for
contractual obligations entered into on behalf of undisclosed or unidentiﬁed principals).
PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 at 678 (Ct.App. 2000).
New Crawford Valley, Ltd. v Benedict, 877 P.2d. 1363 at 1368 (Colo. App. 1993).
J.K. Strader, Understanding White Collar Crime (Newark, N.J., LexisNexis, 2006),
§ 2.07(a); H. First, ‘General Principles Governing the Criminal Liability of Corporations,
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include natural persons in the deﬁnition of the potentially liable, ‘persons’.55 Other
statutes are more direct and speciﬁcally include ‘directors’ in a list of those who
may be found liable.56
An exhaustive list of federal and state statutes under which directors have been
or could be found liable is beyond the scope of this chapter. Sufﬁce it to say that
courts have found that directors may be been found civilly or criminally liable for
authorizing or participating in the violations of statutes in a wide range of substantive
areas of the law including the following: antitrust,57 civil rights,58 employee
beneﬁts,59 mining regulations,60 oil export restrictions,61 and tax collection.62
The potential for director liability for participating in torts or statutory violations
by a corporation raises the question of how actively the director must participate for
liability to attach. Increasingly, the answer is that participation must be fairly direct.
There is a continuum of potential participation ranging from a director committing
the tort or violation herself or himself, to ordering a subordinate in the corporation
to commit the tort or violation, to authorizing the commission, to mere knowledge
of the commission, to constructive knowledge and constructive participation by
virtue of the director’s position, to strict liability.
Courts face little difﬁculty in ﬁnding liability in the case of a director committing,
ordering or authorizing a tort or statutory violation.63 Strict liability and constructive
knowledge or participation by virtue of a director’s position, discussed in Part 5

55

56

57

58

59
60
61

62
63

Their Employees and Ofﬁcers’, in White Collar Crime: Business and Regulatory Offenses,
O. Obermaier and R. Morvillo (eds) (New York, Law Journal Press, 2006), § 5.04(1).
In a seminal case which involved antitrust law, the Supreme Court found that a corporate
ofﬁcer could be criminally liable for violations of the Sherman Act notwithstanding the fact
that the ofﬁcer acted on behalf of a corporation. U.S. v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962).
For one example of a statute that lists individuals – but does not specify directors – as
potentially liable persons and that has been interpreted to ﬁnd directors liable, see the federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act analyzed in note 74 below.
E.g. 15 U.S.C. § 24 (2008) (‘[w]henever a corporation shall violate any of the ... antitrust laws,
such violation shall be deemed to be also that of the individual directors, ofﬁcers, or agents of
such corporation who shall have authorized, ordered, or done any of the acts constituting in
whole or in part such violation’).
U.S. v. Wise, 370 US 405 at 411–14 (1962)(ﬁnding ofﬁcers could be held criminally liable
for violations of predecessor statute cited in n. 56 above, even if they acted on behalf of the
corporation).
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc. 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975)
(directors of community swimming pool liable for discrimination in violation of federal civil
rights statutes).
O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at § 1.12.
E.g. Commonwealth v. Evans, 45 SW.3d 442 at 443 (Ky. 2001).
Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Herrington, 826 F.2d 16 at 25 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1987), cert. denied
denied, 484 US 943 (1987) (holding individual who was director, ofﬁcer and
shareholder could be found liable under price control statute).
O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at § 8.22 n. 13–14.
Fletcher n. 49 above at § 1137.
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below are much rarer phenomena. Many courts have ruled that liability of directors
for corporate torts requires direct participation or negligence.64 Courts are reluctant
to bootstrap negligence theories into imposing liability on a director solely by virtue
of their directorial position.65
Intent is often a necessary element for liability to attach. Many traditional tort
causes of action66 and many, but certainly not all, statutes67 imposing civil liability
require scienter – or intent or knowledge of wrongdoing – as an element of that
liability. Criminal statutes almost always require that the prosecutors prove that
the defendant possessed mens rea for conviction.68 Mens rea in a given criminal
statute might take one of the following four forms according to the simpliﬁed rubric
of the Model Penal Code: intention or purpose,69 knowledge,70 recklessness,71 or
negligence.72
64

65

66
67
68
69

70

For example, Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association, 42 Cal.3d 490 (1986). In that
case, the California Supreme Court announced the following standard:
to maintain a tort claim against a director in his or her personal capacity, a plaintiff
must ﬁrst show that the director speciﬁcally authorized, directed or participated in
the allegedly tortuous conduct; or that although they speciﬁcally knew or reasonably
should have known that some hazardous condition or activity under their control could
injure the plaintiff, they negligently failed to take or order appropriate action to avoid
the harm. Ibid. at 508–9.
See also, K&G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G&G Fishing Tool Serv. 158 Tex. 594 (1958) cert.
denied, 358 US 898 (1958) (stating, in the context of alleged trade secret theft, that Texas law
requires that directors or ofﬁcers are not liable for corporate misconduct by virtue of their
ofﬁce, but only if they are ‘personally connected’ or participated in the misconduct); Escude
Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902 (C.A. Puerto Rico 1980).
R.G. Dennis, ‘Liability of Ofﬁcers, Directors and Stockholders under CERCLA: the Case
for Adopting State Law’ (1991) 36 Villanova Law Review, 1367, 1413–17; O’Neal and
Thompson, n. 31 above at § 8.22.
Fraudulent misrepresentation represents one example. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 526.
See e.g. U.S. ex rel. Wilkins v. North American Const. Corp. 173 F. Supp.2d. 601 (S.D. Tex.
2001) (discussing scienter requirement under False Claims Act).
Strader, n. 54 above at § 2.07(b).
The Model Penal code sets forth the following deﬁnition for purposeful intent, which would
be used to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act
‘purposefully’: A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element
involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or
he believes or hopes that they exist. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a).
The Model Penal code sets forth the following deﬁnition for knowledge, which would be used
to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act ‘knowingly’:
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the
element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a
result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such
a result. Ibid. at § 2.02(2)(b).
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Scienter and other mens rea requirements severely limit the threat of liability
for directors of large, non-closely held corporations as state corporate law typically
allows corporations to delegate management responsibilities to a corporation’s
ofﬁcers, including in bylaw provisions.73 Boards may thus legally delegate extensive
responsibility for oversight of day to day operations to ofﬁcers and employees.
Thus, in a modern corporation, directors may be well insulated from participating
or knowing about the corporate decisions that violate the law.

5 The Responsible Corporate Ofﬁcer Doctrine
A distinct line of cases, however, has removed the scienter and mens rea
requirements and opened up the possibility of strict liability for directors and ofﬁcers
of corporations for violations of certain statutes. These cases fall under the umbrella
of the ‘responsible corporate ofﬁcer’ doctrine, which emerged from a seminal 1943
US Supreme Court case, US v. Dotterweich.74 In the wake of Dotterweich, federal
71

72

73
74

The Model Penal code sets forth the following deﬁnition for recklessness, which would
be used to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act
‘recklessly’: A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustiﬁable risk that the material element exists or
will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would
observe in the actor’s situation. Ibid. at § 2.02(2)(c).
The Model Penal code sets forth the following deﬁnition for negligence, which would be used
to interpret statutes that require, as a mens rea standard, that the defendant act ‘negligently’:
A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be
aware of a substantial and unjustiﬁable risk that the material element exists or will result from
his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to perceive
it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in the actor’s situation. Ibid
Ibid. at § 2.02(2)(d).
For example, 8 Del. C. § 142(a) (2008).
320 US 277, 64 S. Ct. 134, 88 L. Ed. 48. In Dotterweich, the Supreme Court held that a
president and general manager of a corporation could be found guilty of a misdemeanour
violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 52 Stat. 1040, which criminalized
the adulteration or misbranding of drugs introduced into interstate commerce. 320 US at
278 citing 52 Stat. 1040, §§ 301, 303. The Court noted that that Act dispensed with common
requirements of mens rea and, instead, imposed a strict liability standard on any ‘person’ who
violated the Act’s prohibition on adulteration and misbranding. 320 US at 280–81. The Act
deﬁned ‘person’ to include a corporation. Ibid. at 281 citing 52 Stat. 1040, §§ 201(e), 303.
The Court noted the evolution of its analysis in earlier cases that the actions and state
of mind of a corporation’s ofﬁcers and agents could be imputed to a corporation such that
a corporation could be held criminally liable. 320 US at 281–82 citing New York Central
& H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 US 481, (1909). Dotterweich confronted that issue in
reverse. The Court interpreted the Act to impose liability on an ofﬁcer ‘otherwise innocent’
who stood ‘in responsible relation’ to a violation of the Act. 320 US at 281.
A contrary holding, the Court reasoned, would have run counter to the purposes of the Act,
and would hold no individual accountable except in cases in which the corporate veil would
be pierced. Ibid. at 282. (holding that a narrow interpretation of the Act would mean that ‘the
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and state courts have interpreted a range of different statutes to impose liability on
those ‘ofﬁcers’ – including in some cases directors75 (as well as other corporate
employees) – who have a ‘responsible relationship to’, or a ‘responsible share of’,
a violation of the statute by a corporation.76
The 1975 Supreme Court case US v. Park represented a particular milestone and
perhaps the high water mark of the responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine. The Park
Court found that the same food, drug and cosmetic statute at issue in Dotterweich
did not require ‘awareness of some wrongdoing’ because that statute reﬂected a
policy decision by Congress to impose ‘not only a positive duty to seek out and
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement
measures that will insure the violations will not occur.’77 In Park, the Court upheld
the trial conviction of the chief executive ofﬁcer of a corporation that violated the
statute and held that:
the Government establishes a prima facie case when it introduces evidence
sufﬁcient to warrant a ﬁnding by the trier of the facts that the defendant
had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility and authority
either to prevent in the ﬁrst instance, or promptly to correct, the violation
complained of, and that he failed to do so.78
The Court looked to the corporation’s bylaws – including a general provision that
the chief executive ofﬁcer ‘shall, subject to the board of directors, have general and
active supervision of the affairs, business, ofﬁces and employees of the company’

75

76

77
78

penalties of the law could be imposed only in the rare case where the corporation is merely an
individual’s alter ego.’).
The Court found that a determination whether an ofﬁcer or agent of the corporation would
be criminally liable depended on ‘evidence produced at trial’ that the individual had ‘a
responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.’ Ibid. at 284.
The Court refused to ‘indicate by way of illustration the class of employees which stands
in such a responsible relation,’ as such an attempt would be ‘treacherous’ and ‘mischievous
futility.’ Ibid. Rather, the Court entrusted such determination to ‘the good sense of prosecutors,
the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries.’, Ibid.
This holding provoked a sharp dissent from four justices. The dissent found that only
the ‘clear and unambiguous’ imposition of strict liability in a statute can justify holding
ofﬁcers responsible for criminal actions of a corporation without the ofﬁcers having intent
or knowledge of wrongdoing. 320 US at 286 (J. Murphy, dissenting) (citing ‘a fundamental
principle of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence that guilt is personal’.). The dissent found such clear
and ambiguous language lacking in the statute in question. Ibid. at 287–93.
‘Responsible corporate ofﬁcers’ are not limited to ‘ofﬁcers’ as deﬁned in state corporation
statutes, but may include directors and other agents of the corporation, provided they meet
the relevant standards. See n. 94 below and accompanying text.
In U.S. v. Park, the US Supreme Court articulated the ‘responsible share’ standard as the
touchstone for when an ofﬁcer or director may be held liable under the responsible corporate
ofﬁcer doctrine, 421 US 658 (1975).
Ibid. at 672–73.
Ibid. at 673–74.
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– to ﬁnd that the ofﬁcer indeed had a responsible share of the violation.79 This
ruling came despite testimony that the corporate organizational structure delegated
operational responsibilities to other ofﬁcers and departments.80
Subsequent federal court decisions have applied this responsible corporate ofﬁcer
doctrine to federal statutes in a number of substantive ﬁelds, including the following:
hazardous waste clean-up,81 water pollution,82 tax law,83 controlled substances84 and
petroleum allocation.85 Plaintiffs have also sought, with mixed success, to apply the
doctrine to federal employee beneﬁts law litigation over the failure by corporations
to contribute to employee pension funds.86 In addition, state courts have also applied
this federal doctrine to state statutes, including in the following areas of law: water
pollution,87 waste disposal,88 building safety codes,89 pension contributions,90 state
securities fraud,91 consumer fraud92 and state sales taxes.93
Despite its name, the doctrine may apply to directors as well as ofﬁcers.94
Nevertheless, a rough survey of the cases reveals that those instances where a director
79
80

81
82
83
84
85
86
87

88

89
90
91
92
93
94

Ibid. at 663.
The jury convicted the chief executive ofﬁcer despite his testimony that (i) the ‘company
had an organizational structure for responsibilities . . . according to which different phases
of its operation,’ including sanitation ‘were assigned to individuals who, in turn, have staff
and departments under them’; (ii) he investigated reported violations; and (iii) he ordered
corrective steps when he learned of these violations. Ibid. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
See Part 6 below.
U.S. v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001)(applying doctrine to Clean Water Act).
Thomsen v. U.S., 887 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1989)(holding treasurer and vice-president of closely
held corporation liable as ‘responsible person’ for failure to remit taxes to government).
U.S. v. Hodges X-Ray, Inc., 759 F.2d 557 (6th Cir. 1985).
U.S. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 408 F. Supp. 450 (W.D. Pa 1975).
Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 24.
State, Dep’t of Environmental Protection v. Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 284 N.J. Super.
381 (App. Div. 1995); BEC Corp. v. Dep’t of Environmental Protection, 256 Conn. 602
(2001); State, Dep’t of Ecology v. Lundgren, 94 Wash. App. 236 (Div. 2 1999); B.J. Monachino
‘Courts May Find Individuals Liable for Environmental Offenses without Piercing Corporate
Shield’ (May, 2000) 72 New York State Bar Journal 22, 33.
Commissioner, Dept. of Environmental Management v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556 (Ind.
2001); In Matter of Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Matthews,
7 Ca. App. 4th 1052 (2d Dist 1992).
People ex rel. Volberg v. Durch, 530 N.Y.S.2d 956 (1988).
O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at §8.22.
Wittenberg v. Gallagher, 2001 WL 34048121 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 1 2001).
State ex rel. Miller v. Santa Rosa Sales and Marketing, Inc., 475 N.W.2d 210 (Iowa 1991).
State v. Longstreet, 536 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
Commission, Dept. of Environmental Management v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556 (Ind. 2001);
Paper-Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Intern. Union v. Sherman Lumber
Co., 2001 WL 1719233 (Me. Super. Ct. 2001).
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who was not also an ofﬁcer of the corporation has been found civilly or criminally
liable under the responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine represent a relatively small
fraction of the total. Part of the explanation for this may be prosecutorial decisions
to pursue cases against ofﬁcers who are more directly involved in statutory
violations. But, a more compelling explanation, explained further below, is that
courts subsequent to Park have taken a much narrower view of when a director or
ofﬁcer has responsibility for a violation.
Indeed, Dotterweich and Park left two important questions unanswered. First, to
which statutes would the responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine apply, and second,
under what circumstances could a director have a ‘responsible share’ in a statutory
violation and thus be a ‘responsible corporate ofﬁcer’?
With respect to the ﬁrst question, recent cases indicate that federal courts will
demand that the language of a statute be very explicit for the responsible corporate
ofﬁcer doctrine to apply. In the 2003 decision in Meyer v. Holley,95 the US Supreme
Court rejected a contention that the federal Fair Housing Act96 imposed liability on
the sole shareholder and president of a real estate corporation for an employee’s
violation of that statute’s prohibition on housing discrimination practices.97 The
Court focused on the language of the statute and a related agency regulation
and found neither explicitly created liability for an ofﬁcer or sole shareholder
of a corporation.98 Moreover, the Court characterized Dotterweich as applying
‘unusually strict’ and ‘non-traditional’ rules of vicarious liability, and underscored
that the Court would apply such rules only ‘where Congress has speciﬁed that such

95
96
97
98

In U.S. v. Ming Hong, the Fourth Circuit found that even a person who was not a formal
ofﬁcer or director of a corporation, could be held liable for violations of the Clean Water Act
as a ‘responsible corporate ofﬁcer.’ 242 F.3d 528 at 531 (4th Cir. 2001) (‘the gravamen of
liability as a responsible corporate ofﬁcer is not one’s corporate title or lack thereof; rather,
the pertinent question is whether the defendant bore such a relationship to the corporation
that it is appropriate to hold him criminally liable for failing to prevent the charged violations
of the [Clean Water Act]’). The Court found that, despite the fact that the defendant ‘avoided
any formal association’ with the corporation that violated the statute and that he ‘was not
identiﬁed as an ofﬁcer of the company,’ he ‘substantially controlled corporate operations.’
Ibid. at 530 at 532.
537 U.S. 280 (2003).
42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (2008).
Meyer, 537 U.S. at 289–91.
Ibid. at 286–88. The court found that the language in the agency regulation would hold the
corporation but not the sole-shareholder/president personally liable. The regulation said
that complaints to the agency that the statute was violated may be ﬁled, against any person
who directs or controls, or has the right to direct or control, the conduct of another person
with respect to any aspect of the sale of dwellings … if that other person, acting within the
scope of his or her authority as employee or agent of the directing or controlling person
has engaged … in a discriminatory housing practice. Ibid. at 288 citing 24 CFR §103.20(b)
(1999) (repealed)(emphasis in the court opinion not in the regulation).
Thus, for a shareholder, director or ofﬁcer to be liable, the employee would have had to have
been acting as agent for that shareholder, director or ofﬁcer rather than for the corporation.
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was its intent.’99 Thus, Meyer signalled that federal courts should not apply the
corporate responsible ofﬁcer doctrine in the absence of clear Congressional intent;
clear statutory language is necessary to dispense with mens rea and hold directors
and ofﬁcers strictly liable for corporate misconduct.100
Although Meyer signals that federal courts will not extend liberally the responsible
corporate ofﬁcer doctrine to new statutes, it does not roll back existing case law
applying the doctrine to speciﬁc federal statutes, nor does it affect interpretation
and application of the doctrine by state courts to state statutes. Moreover, in an
interesting cross-pollination of common law and statute, a number of federal and
state statutes have explicitly incorporated the doctrine by including ‘responsible
corporate ofﬁcers’ or similar concepts in the deﬁnition of persons liable. Among
the federal statutes in this category are the following: provisions in the tax code,101
the Clean Water Act102 and the Clean Air Act.103 (In addition, federal securities laws
include provisions holding ‘control persons’ liable for certain violations.104)
Just as Meyer constricted the criteria for application of the doctrine to statutes,
so too, with respect to the second question, have recent federal cases narrowed the
criteria for who may be a responsible corporate ofﬁcer. These cases have taken a
much more restrictive view of when a director or ofﬁcer has a ‘responsible share’
of a violation, by requiring that the director or ofﬁcer have more direct oversight
of the speciﬁc operations of a corporation that led to the violation.105 These cases
represent a signiﬁcant reversal in course from Park, which suggests that, if directors
have ultimate responsibility for all the affairs of a corporation, they might be liable,
even if they delegated supervisory responsibility for speciﬁc areas of the business
to ofﬁcers and others.106
This reversal means that, in determining whether a director had a ‘responsible
share’ of a violation, a court might give less weight than Park did to evaluating an
individual’s general authority under both the statute under which the corporation is
99 Meyer, 537 U.S. at 287, 289.
100 Cf.
Cf United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Company, 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991)

101

102
103
104
105
106

(holding that explicit ‘knowing’ requirement for criminal liability under hazardous waste
disposal statute could not be obviated by responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine).
More speciﬁcally, the tax code imposes liability on ‘responsible persons’ for failure to pay
employment taxes. 26 USC §§ 6671, 6672 (2008). For a case in which a director, who had
substantial operational control over a corporation’s ﬁnances (including the ability to borrow
money on behalf of the entity), was held liable under this statute, see Jenson v. U.S., 23 F.3d
1393 (8th Cir. 1994).
33 USC § 1319(c)(6) (2008).
42 USC § 7413(h) (2008).
15 USC § 77–o (2008).
Strader, n. 54 above at §7.02(c) (‘a “responsible” corporate ofﬁcer is one who possessed
supervisory responsibilities for the matter in question.’).
See n. 79–80 above and accompanying text.
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organized, and the corporation’s certiﬁcate of incorporation and bylaws.107 A court
would likely focus more on whether statutes and a corporation’s organizational
documents task a director with more direct oversight of the particular area of a
corporation’s operations involved in legal misconduct. Moreover, a court might
look at actual day-to-day activities and responsibilities of a director.

6 A Case Study: CERCLA
CERCLA presents one of the single most signiﬁcant statutory sources of potential
liability for directors. This act also has spawned the most extensive and convoluted
case law on director and ofﬁcer statutory liability, and thus represents an ideal lens
with which to compare veil piercing, agency and responsible corporate ofﬁcer
theories.
This statute, which Congress passed in 1980 in the wake of the Love Canal
disaster, regulates the clean-up of land contaminated by hazardous waste, also
known as ‘Superfund’ sites.108 To pay for this clean-up, CERCLA holds strictly
liable persons who:
(1) currently own or operate a facility where hazardous substances have
been released into the environment;
(2) formerly owned or operated a facility when hazardous substances were
disposed of at that facility; or
(3) generated or arranged for disposal or treatment of a hazardous substance
that was released into the environment.109
Liability, once it attaches to these persons, is strict, joint and several.110 Under
the Act, ‘persons’ includes individuals, corporations and other business entities.111
But, the Act deﬁnes both ‘owner’ and ‘operator’ only in a tautological manner.112
Thus federal courts have been forced into the breach to deﬁne these terms and
determine when individual defendants – directors, ofﬁcers, employees and agents
107 Although many state corporations statutes vest the responsibility of managing the business and

108

109
110
111
112

affairs of a corporation in the board, statutes also provide that the certiﬁcate of incorporation
or bylaws may give signiﬁcant managerial responsibility to ofﬁcers. See, e.g. 8 Del. C. §§ 109,
141 (2008).
For background on CERCLA and a recent analysis of the state of the responsible corporate
ofﬁcer doctrine under the statute in the wake of the Bestfoods case (analyzed below) see B.
Moore ‘The Corporate Ofﬁcer as CERCLA Operator: Applying the Holding in United States
v. Bestfoods to the Determination of Ofﬁcer Liability’ (1999) 12 Tulane Environmental Law
Journal, 519.
42 USC § 9607(a)(1)–(3)(2008).
Moore, n. 108 above at 526.
42 USC § 9601(21)(2008).
42 USC § 9601(20)(A)(ii)(2008).
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– may be liable as ‘owners’ or ‘operators’ (or in some cases as ‘arrangers’) for
the CERCLA violations of a corporation. In doing so, federal courts have applied
– often confusing and conﬂating – each of the veil piercing, direct liability/agency/
participation and responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrines.113
Within direct liability CERCLA theories for holding directors, ofﬁcers and
shareholders liable, courts have historically taken wildly different approaches. The
most common approach has been to hold directors, ofﬁcers and shareholders liable
as ‘operators’ for CERCLA violations in which they directly participate.114 But,
several federal trial and appellate courts went a step further and held that directors
and ofﬁcers could be liable for violations of the statute if they had the ‘capacity
to control’ those operations in the facility that led to the violations, regardless of
whether they knew or directly participated in violations.115
A few courts went yet further by ‘eliminating the requirement that the particular
harm in question have any relation to areas within such person’s capacity to
control.’116 One scholar argues that a series of cases pushed the envelope and
‘focused on the defendant’s general participation in the management of the facility,
or even the management of the corporation.’117 In describing this progression, this
scholar noted, ‘[c]ompletely lost… are the concepts of active participation in the
management of the facility or personal participation in the wrongful act that caused
the damage.’118
This difference between the ‘direct participation’ and ‘capacity to control’
theories of CERCLA case law parallels the differences between the ‘direct liability/
participation’ theory of liability and the ‘responsible corporate ofﬁcer’ doctrine
outlined in Parts 4 and 5 of this chapter. At the same time, the range of CERCLA
standards on ‘capacity to control’ mirrors the spectrum in the ‘responsible ofﬁcer’
doctrine with respect to the question of how particularized must a responsible
ofﬁcer’s oversight responsibilities be for he or she to have liability for a statutory
violation. However, characterizing CERCLA cases on a continuum also masks the
113 See Dennis, n. 65 at 1375–1410. Dennis analyzes how courts have confused veil piercing
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115

116
117
118

with direct participation theories, by seeming to imply that direct participation is a method to
pierce the veil. Ibid. at 1377, n. 40 citing NEPACCO II, 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied
denied, 484 US 848 (1987).
Moore, n. 108 above at 526–28; L.J. Oswald and C.A. Schipani, ‘CERCLA and the “Erosion”
of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine’ (1992) 86 Northwestern University Law Review, 259
(1992); C.A. Schipani, ‘Integrating Corporate Law Principles with CERCLA Liability for
Environmental Hazards’ (1993) 18 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 1, 5.
This is also known as the ‘authority to control’ test. See Moore, n. 108 above at 533–40.
Moore distinguishes cases in which courts based director and ofﬁcer liability determination
on whether the individual had ‘actual control’ over hazardous substances from those that used
an ‘authority to control’ test. Ibid. at 529–40.
Dennis, n. 65 above at 1387–88.
Ibid. at 1388.
Ibid. at 1389.
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fact that many of the cases lacked logical coherency and may fall at once on various
points on the spectrum.119
In 1998, the Supreme Court re-entered the fray over CERCLA in U.S. v.
Bestfoods;120 and provided much needed clarity to the analysis of the three doctrines:
veil piercing, direct liability/participation liability and responsible corporate ofﬁcer
liability. Even though the case involved liability of a parent corporation for a
subsidiary, its holdings would likely also apply to director and ofﬁcer liability under
the statute. Three ﬁndings stand out – ﬁrst, the Bestfoods opinion held that a parent
corporation could be liable as an owner or operator under CERCLA under a veil
piercing theory, but only if the common law rules for veil piercing apply; the statute
did not create a new veil piercing standard.121
Second, the opinion clariﬁed that a parent may be liable, even absent veil
piercing, under a direct participation theory.122 The Court thus underscored the
critical distinction between veil piercing and agency/participation theories outlined
in this chapter. But, Bestfoods held that for a parent corporation to be liable under
CERCLA, it must participate directly in the operation of the violating facility, not
merely in the operations of the violating subsidiary.123 Mere overlap of directors
between the parent and subsidiary is insufﬁcient to ﬁnd direct participation, as the
Court reasoned,
[a]ctivities that involve the facility but which are consistent with the
parent’s investor status, such as monitoring of the subsidiary’s performance,
supervision of the subsidiary’s performance, supervision of the subsidiary’s
ﬁnance and capital budget decisions, and articulation of general policies and
procedures, should not give rise to direct liability.124
Again, Bestfoods analyzed parent/subsidiary liability, but it nevertheless sends a
strong signal as to how the Court would rule on matters of the liability of individual
directors and ofﬁcers under CERCLA. The Court was unequivocal that liability as
an ‘operator’ under a participation theory required very direct participation in the
operation of the facility, not of the corporation as a whole. For directors to be liable
as operators, it would seem they too would need to have directly participated in
operating the facility.125
119 Ibid. at 1376.
120 524 US 51 (1998).
121 Ibid. at 62–64. The Court recited some of the usual tests for veil piercing, but did not specify
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the weight that would be given to each nor did it settle whether state or federal common law
on veil piercing should apply in CERCLA veil piercing cases. Ibid. at 64.
Ibid. at 64-65.
Ibid. at 67-68.
Ibid. at 72 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Some courts and scholars have also made this conclusion. See Moore, n. 108 above at 544–50
citing U.S. v. Green, 33 F. Supp.2d 203, 217 (W.D.N.Y. 1998). Moore also notes that some
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Conclusion: Towards an Explanation for the Structure of
Director Liability Rules in the United States

Bestfoods serves as a bellwether for the current state of the three most important
sources of director liability outlined in this chapter. Veil piercing continues as an
important corporate law doctrine, but continues to suffer from uncertainty as to its
core principles. Complicating the analysis, cases in which directors have been held
liable under veil piercing without also being shareholders and ofﬁcers remain rare.
Directors also face liability for torts and statutory violations in which they
participate, but courts increasingly require fairly direct participation for liability to
attach. The responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine survives as an alternative source
of liability for directors and courts may dispense with requirements that directors
have actual knowledge of, or intent to commit misconduct. Yet federal courts appear
unwilling to extend this doctrine to new statutes absent clear statutory language. Even
within the responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine, courts have moved to requiring
that directors and ofﬁcers have fairly particularized oversight responsibility for the
speciﬁc operations that led to a violation for liability to attach.
Several deeper legal trends and themes lie underneath the movement in these
three doctrines. First, director liability under both participation and responsible
corporate ofﬁcer doctrines appears to be a more signiﬁcant risk in closely held
corporations in which directors are also often ofﬁcers and shareholders and are
much more involved in the daily affairs of the corporation.126 This parallels veil
piercing, which, as noted above, does not occur in the context of publicly traded
corporations.127
Second, courts appear less creative in invoking criminal liability rather than
civil; for example, courts are much less willing to dispense with the core criminal
law requirement of mens rea than they are with civil law scienter.128 Third, there
is a continued movement of federal courts towards a strict construction of statutes
and away from implying remedies.129 This movement has given new vitality to the
canon of statutory construction which says that judges must strictly construe statutes

126
127
128

129

courts seem to have misinterpreted Bestfoods to mean that directors and ofﬁcers can only be
liable when the corporate veil is pierced. Ibid. at 547 citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Ter
Maat, 13 F.Supp.2d 756, 763–65 (N.D.Ill. 1998).
O’Neal and Thompson, n. 31 above at § 1.12.
See n. 30 above and accompanying text.
See MacDonald & Watson, 933 F.2d 35 at 51–52 (expressing less willingness in context of
criminal statutes to use responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine to override explicit knowledge
requirements for individual liability).
For a historical analysis of the evolution of statutory interpretation in the United States, see
W.D. Popkin, Statutes in Court: the History and Theory of Statutory Interpretation (Durham,
Duke University Press, 1999). Popkin describes the dominant mode of statutory interpretation
in the twentieth century up until the 1960s as ‘purposive’, but then describes a shift to ‘modern
textualism’ that looked to reduce the interpretative role of judges. Ibid. at 115–188.
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that derogate from common law – which usually means pre-20th century common
law.130 At the same time, the dominant view looks to limit mid-20th century case
law interpreting statutes (itself a form of common law) where courts were more
willing to see in statutes evidence of legislative intent to provide remedies where
the common law was insufﬁcient.
These judicial trends cannot deny that statutes in a few areas of law, most notably
environmental law, have explicit and historically novel provisions to hold directors
and ofﬁcers liable for corporate misconduct. These trends have also not reversed
earlier novel judicial interpretations ﬁnding individual liability under certain food
and drug statutes.
But, what explains why these substantive areas of the law are more open to
director liability? Perhaps statutes in these areas merely reﬂect the more progressive
eras in which they were enacted or public demand for legal redress in the wake of
corporate scandals. Alternatively, it might be that the harms addressed by these
statutes are greater in magnitude and affect a greater number of people, and,
therefore, greater deterrence of directors and ofﬁcers is warranted. Indeed, courts
have often remarked that the strict liability regime of the responsible corporate
ofﬁcer doctrine applies only to a narrow class of ‘public welfare’ statutes.131
But, directors and ofﬁcers might also face more liability under environmental
law than, say, employee beneﬁts law132 for the same efﬁciency reasons that scholars
advocate differing standards for tort and contract creditors in veil piercing cases: the
victims of environmental liability have far less ability to avoid and bargain out of
losses and thus bear a clearer resemblance to tort creditors.
In any event, various legal doctrines together ensure that directors face far less
liability for corporate misconduct than in other countries surveyed in this volume.
Why is this? This may reﬂect the structure of US corporate law which not only
gives directors great discretion in making decisions, but allows them to delegate
more responsibility to ofﬁcers and employees of the corporation. Directors of US
corporations may thus be more removed from much of corporate decision-making
and thus more insulated from liability for corporate misconduct than directors of
corporations in other countries.
130 For scholarship explaining and supporting this canon, see, e.g. J.R. Stoner Jr, ‘The Idiom

of Common Law in the Formation of Judicial Power’ in The Supreme Court and American
Constitutionalism, B.P. Wilson and K. Masugi (eds) (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littleﬁeld,
1998).
131 E.g. Celentano v. Rocque, 282 Conn. 645, 671 (2007).
132 Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 28–29 (noting that pension cases appear
to require more direct participation by an individual for liability compared to CERCLA cases
and speculating this is because collective labour bargaining means ‘there would have been
some theoretical chance to bargain for individual liability’). See also Dennis, n. 65 above at
1394–96 (citing numerous ERISA cases rejecting individual liability).
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Yet, that is a descriptive, not a normative statement, and does not answer the
question of why US law gives directors greater insulation from decision-making
and liability. It only raises the question – why should US law not expect directors
to take a more active role in preventing at least the most serious forms of corporate
misconduct?
The structure of the rules for holding directors liable creates a disincentive for
directors to actively monitor and police corporate operations for potential legal
misconduct. As noted above, many criminal and civil statutes require knowledge by
a defendant of a legal violation for liability to attach to that individual.133 Even under
strict liability statutes, application of the responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine to
a director generally requires the director to have oversight responsibility for the
particular operations of the business that violated the statute.134 Directors may,
therefore, be reluctant to monitor operations with a high risk of statutory violations
for fear of being held liable for this misconduct by virtue of their knowledge or
management. The extent to which these perverse incentives actually change director
behaviour requires empirical study.135
On the other hand, holding directors liable for corporate misconduct would
create an incentive for them to detect and reduce the level of corporate lawbreaking.
Considered in isolation, this incentive would be clearly desirable. But, director
liability also comes with costs. Part 7.1 sketches due process and normative
arguments with respect to not holding directors liable. Part 7.2 considers economic
explanations – both public choice and efﬁciency – for why directors are not held
liable more often. Part 7.3 outlines the effects of director liability on risk-spreading
and, conversely, the impact of corporate insurance and indemniﬁcation on rules
imposing director liability. Part 7.4 analyzes the extent to which corporate and
securities laws serve as a counterweight to the disincentive for directors to monitor
created the by the rules described above in this chapter. Part 7.5 offers a concluding
analysis.

7.1.

DUE PROCESS AND NORMATIVE ARGUMENTS

Concern for the constitutional due process of individuals clearly animates the
legislative and judicial reluctance to hold directors and ofﬁcers liable in the absent
direct knowledge or participation in corporate misconduct. Strict liability and the
responsible corporate ofﬁcer doctrine are the exceptions not the norms. This due

133 See n. 66–70 above and accompanying text.
134 See n. 105 above and accompanying text.
135 One potential way to measure these disincentives would be to compare corporate governance

metrics (such as those created by investor activist groups) for companies in an industry
with higher potential director liability due to statute (for example, hazardous waste disposal
companies with CERCLA exposure) with a control group of companies.
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process concern is particularly intense in criminal law cases, as deep norms embedded
in criminal law require that criminal liability match individual culpability.136
But, this does not necessarily end the analysis of why directors are not held
liable. One could imagine a set of rules that would hold directors liable even absent
direct participation or knowledge and that would nonetheless accord with norms of
culpability, if the background expectation of corporate law was that directors should
be actively involved in corporate decision-making and monitoring of misconduct.

7.2

ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS: RENT-SEEKING, DETERRENCE,
DELEGATION AND THE MARKET FOR DIRECTORS

The question then becomes, why does US corporate law not expect this level of
engagement from directors? One economic explanation rooted in public choice
theory is that directors and other corporate managers have engaged in rentseeking behaviour to take advantage of legal rules to insulate themselves. Under
this explanation, directors and corporate management in general have chosen to
incorporate (or move the state of incorporation) in states whose laws provide them
with maximum ﬂexibility in decision-making and delegation. This not only insulates
directors and ofﬁcers from liability to shareholders, but has the collateral beneﬁt
of reducing their responsibility for corporate misconduct affecting third parties or
the public. This explanation represents a version of the ‘race to the bottom’ theory
of the competition among states for incorporations.137 Moreover, directors and
management can use the resources of the corporation available to them to inﬂuence
the development of the law, including through corporate campaign contributions.
In an altogether different intellectual vein, one could take seriously the idea
that economic efﬁciency shapes not only corporate law, but the rules for director
liability outlined above. Applying economic logic, the law should hold directors
(and ofﬁcers) liable for corporate misconduct only when liability actually deters that
misconduct. But, holding directors liable may lead to over-deterrence if directors
cannot efﬁciently bear risk.138 Moreover, if directors have little direct control over
the operations of a corporation that cause social loss, then it would be severely
inefﬁcient to hold them liable for those losses.
Again, this begs the question of whether the hierarchy of corporate decisionmaking in which directors are not intimately involved in operations should be taken
as immutable. If directors were held liable, they would likely become much more
involved in corporate decision-making to detect and thwart misconduct in order to
mitigate their legal exposure as individuals. This would undoubtedly reduce the
incidence and magnitude of corporate misconduct.
136 Strader, n. 54 above at § 2.07(b).
137 See n. 23 above and accompanying text.
138 Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate

Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 27.
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It would also come with several costs. First, directors may become much
more risk averse in their decisions. The extent of this risk aversion and whether
it would lead to suboptimal decision-making or merely remedy a moral hazard of
directors remains an open question and warrants further empirical study. Second
and similarly, increased liability might encourage directors to micromanage their
subordinates, thereby erasing the efﬁciency gains of delegation within the ﬁrm. The
extent to which this would happen and the net social loss that would occur if it did,
again, require empirical research in order to move beyond theoretical speculation.
Third, increased liability might simply drive individuals out of the market for
directors. Even worse, it might create a ‘lemons’ problem by driving more risk
averse, cautious and law-abiding persons out of the market for directors and leaving
the pool for directorships full of more aggressive and less scrupulous individuals.
These theoretical costs of increasing director liability for corporate torts and
statutory violations mirror the arguments made against increasing director liability
to shareholders under either ﬁduciary duties of corporate law or securities law.
Nevertheless, even scholarly arguments on the effects of increased director liability
on the market for directors often represent theoretical assertions or are based
largely on anecdote; sound empirical validation of these assertions remains a work
in progress.139 But, as with any empirical research in corporate and ﬁnancial law,
untangling the skein of causal links proves extremely difﬁcult.

7.3

RISK-SPREADING, INSURANCE AND INDEMNIFICATION

The effects of liability on director incentives – including the deterrence value of
liability rules – are blunted to the extent directors are indemniﬁed or insured for that
liability. Most state corporation statutes allow corporations to indemnify directors
for civil and criminal liability. For lawsuits, other than those involving liability
to the corporation and shareholders, the corporation typically may pay not only a
director’s expenses (such as attorneys’ fees), but judgments, ﬁnes and settlement
amounts as well. Statutory conditions for indemniﬁcation in these cases are often not
particularly onerous. For example, Delaware law allows corporations to indemnify
a director so long as he or she:

139 For a sample of arguments in the literature of the effects of increased liability on the market

for directors, see A. Hamdani and R. Kraakman, ‘Rewarding Outside Directors’ (2007) 105
Michigan Law Review, 1677, 1690; B. Black, ‘Outside Director Liability’ (2006) 58 Stanford
Law Review 1055, 1058 (2006) citing R. Romano, ‘What Went Wrong with Directors’ and
Ofﬁcers’ Liability Insurance?’ (1989) 14 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 1, 1-2.
Several studies have attempted to measure the effects of liability on the market through
surveys; e.g. J. Sarra, ‘Corporate Governance in Global Capital Markets: Canadian and
International Developments’ (2002) 76 Tulane Law Review 1691, 1700 (2002) (critiquing
one such survey). Survey research presents obvious biases.
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acted in good faith and in a manner [the director] reasonably believed to be
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect
to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the
[director’s] conduct was unlawful.140
Moreover, corporations may purchase insurance for directors to cover those
liabilities that corporations may be statutorily prohibited from indemnifying.141 Of
course, corporate insolvency can limit the value of indemniﬁcation and directors
and ofﬁcers’ insurance policies have coverage limitations that may leave directors
exposed for breaches of certain laws or for intentional misconduct; many insurance
companies explicitly carve out CERCLA liability from coverage under director and
ofﬁcer policies.142
The presence or absence of indemniﬁcation and insurance complicates that
analysis of another economic objective, risk-spreading. Risk-spreading reﬂects the
objective of allocating losses to a party that can most bear the losses most efﬁciently.
In other words, losses should be allocated to the best ‘insurer’. Often the party that
can best bear losses is the one that can pass losses on to a wide number of other
persons.143 Scholars have argued that risk-spreading argues against holding directors
and ofﬁcers liable, as individuals are less able to diversify away this liability.144
This conclusion would change though if directors beneﬁted from indemniﬁcation
or insurance, which would allow risks to be spread to the corporation and insurance
providers.
On the other hand, risk-spreading via indemniﬁcation and insurance creates
the potential for moral hazard and compromises the deterrence value of director
liability. Indemniﬁcation and insurance also pose agency costs as directors seek
to pass to shareholders losses for misconduct. Moreover, risk-spreading obtained
through director liability with indemniﬁcation and insurance raises the question of
whether the same result could be achieved more directly by holding the corporation
liable and dispensing with director liability altogether.

140 8 Del. C. § 145(a). Compare this to §145(b) which allows a corporation to indemnify directors
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142

143
144

for actions ‘by or in the right of the corporation’ but excludes indemniﬁcation if the director is
adjudged liable.
E.g. 8 Del. C. § 145(g). Many statutes, including CERCLA, allow corporations to indemnify
individuals. See e.g. U.S. v. Lowe, 29 F.3d 1005 (5th Cir. 1994).
W.S. Biel, ‘Comment: Whistling Past the Waste Site: Directors’ and Ofﬁcers’ Personal
Liability for Environmental Decisions and the Role of Liability Insurance Coverage’ (1991)
140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 241.
Thompson, ‘Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise’ n. 31 above at 3.
Ibid. at 3–4.
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7.4 CORPORATE AND SECURITIES LAW COUNTERWEIGHTS TO THE
DISINCENTIVES TO DIRECTOR MONITORING.
To the extent that the director liability rules outlined in this chapter do create a
disincentive for directors to closely supervise businesses and correct illegal acts,
US corporate law presents only a mild corrective. Historically, the ﬁduciary duty
of care has imposed a general obligation on directors to attend meetings, become
familiar with the nature of the corporation’s business and monitor its operations.145
But, liability for duty of care obligations is blunted by deference directors are given
under the business judgment rule.146
However, over a decade ago, the Delaware Court of Chancery (arguably the most
inﬂuential state court for corporate law) increased the duties of directors to monitor
corporate operations for potential illegal conduct in the In re Caremark International
Inc. Derivative Litigation case.147 Caremark articulated two obligations of boards
of Delaware corporations. First, boards must monitor the corporation to ensure that
it is complying with the law. This obligation includes responsibility for designing
management and information systems that ensure that employees detect and report
non-compliance with the law to superiors and that information on non-compliance
percolates up to the board.148 Second, the Board must sift through the information
145 See, e.g. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 NJ 15 (1981).
146 Professor Clark explains the deference courts give to business decisions of directors and

ofﬁcers in the face of lawsuits alleging duty of care violations thus, the business judgment of
the directors will not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, and the directors
will not be held liable for the consequences of their exercise of business judgment – even for
judgments that appear to have been clear mistakes – unless certain exceptions apply. Clark,
n. 42 above at 123.
Clark then elaborates that these exceptions consist of acts by the directors that constitute
fraud, illegality and conﬂict of interest or, according to some courts and scholars and in
limited circumstances, gross negligence. Ibid. at 124.
147 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.1996). For a comprehensive analysis of Caremark and its progeny, see
H.A. Sale, ‘Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith’ (2007) 32 Delaware Journal of Corporate
Law, 719.
148 The Chancery Court opinion set the standard for when a board breached its duty to monitor.
The opinion found that a board of directors could not, satisfy their obligation to be reasonably
informed concerning the corporation, without assuring themselves that information and
reporting systems exist in the organization that are reasonably designed to provide to
senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufﬁcient to allow
management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed judgments concerning
both the corporation’s compliance with law and its business performance. Caremark, 698
A.2d at 970.
At the same time, the opinion indicated that courts would be deferential as to the design of
information systems, particularly as to the extent of information that would be reported up the
ladder to the board.
Obviously the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a question
of business judgment. And obviously too, no rationally designed information and reporting
system will remove the possibility that the corporation will violate laws or regulations, or that
senior ofﬁcers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or otherwise fail reasonably
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it receives and make further investigation if the information suggests problems149
– what a later case labelled ‘red ﬂags’ – 150 or otherwise face possible liability to
shareholders for losses from the corporation’s non-compliance with laws.151 In
this later case, Stone v. Ritter, the Delaware Supreme Court (a higher court than
the Chancery Court) not only afﬁrmed Caremark, it framed the Caremark duties
as good faith obligations that implicated the duty of loyalty to shareholders. This
marks a critical turn, as courts defer much less to decisions to directors involving
the duty of loyalty compared to decisions challenged under the duty of care.152
However, the effect of the Caremark decision on director liability for corporate
violations of the law is tempered in a number of respects. First, Delaware courts
have indicated that they will defer to the business judgment of directors and
management in how compliance systems are designed and how much information
is channelled to directors.153 The tension between this business judgment deference
and the language of Stone invoking ‘good faith’ and the duty of loyalty remains to
be resolved in future cases. In any event, the requirement of compliance systems
does not mean that the board must have detailed knowledge of all aspects of a
corporation’s operations.154 Moreover, Caremark duties run to shareholders and
do not create director liability to the government or third parties. Together, these
limitations strongly suggest that a board could satisfy its Caremark duties without
becoming actively involved enough in corporate operations to trigger liability to the
government or third parties under veil piercing, direct participation or responsible
corporate ofﬁcer theories.
Nevertheless, federal securities laws serve as a backstop to corporate law duties;
securities law increases the incentives and abilities of directors of public corporations
to monitor the activities and potential legal violations of their corporations in two
ways. First, securities law creates demand by directors for information about
potential corporate misconduct; directors of public companies have a great incentive
to monitor corporate operations due to federal securities laws that impose liability
on directors for the accuracy of a company’s disclosure.155 In addition to general

149
150
151
152
153
154
155

to detect acts material to the corporation’s compliance with the law. But it is important that the
board exercise a good faith judgment that the corporation’s information and reporting system
is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate information will come
to its attention in a timely manner as a matter of ordinary operations, so that it may satisfy its
responsibility. Ibid.
Ibid. See Sale, n. 146 above at 752–53.
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 at 364 (Del. 2006).
Caremark, 698 A.2d at 370.
Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; Sale, n. 146 above at 730.
See n. 147 above.
Sale, n. 146 above at 732 citing Stone, 911 A.2d at 368.
Of particular note, s. 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability on directors for any
material inaccuracies in a corporation’s registration statement ﬁled with the Securities and
Exchange Commission and disclosed to investors. 15 USC § 77k(a)(2–3) (2008).

GERDING: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

329

antifraud rules, federal securities regulations require intensive disclosure about,
among other things, a public company’s operations and legal risks.156 Therefore,
in order to avail them of the due diligence defence to various forms of disclosure
liability, directors must then reasonably inform themselves of potential misconduct
and legal violations by the corporation.157
Second, recent securities laws have addressed the supply of information to
directors regarding corporate misconduct. The 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act represented
a signiﬁcant entry of federal law into corporate governance, historically the province
of state law.158 The Act and SEC regulations promulgated under the Act addressed
the supply of information to boards regarding corporate misconduct in several ways.
Most notably, the Act and subsequent regulations mandated that public companies
assess and certify the adequacy of their internal disclosure and control systems.
Under section 302 of the Act, executive ofﬁcers of publicly registered corporations
are required to certify the adequacy of internal ﬁnancial reporting systems,159
and similarly, under section 404, management and auditors of those corporations
are required to issue a report on the adequacy of internal control over ﬁnancial
reporting.160
Section 404 has proven the most controversial provision in the Act, as many
companies have complained about the expense of investigating and redesigning
internal control systems without regard to the potential magnitude of fraud that must
be interdicted.161 Beyond internal controls, the Sarbanes Oxley Act and regulations
also include a set of reporting standards and whistleblower protections designed
to encourage employees and agents of a public corporation (including lawyers)
to report fraud ‘up the ladder’ in the corporation and ultimately to the board of
directors.162
156 For example, public companies must disclose to investors pending legal proceedings. See

17 CFR § 229.103 (2007).

157 For example, s. 11 offers directors a defence to liability if, after performing due diligence,
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they reasonably believed that the registration statement was materially accurate. 15 USC
§ 77k(b).
For an exploration of the linkages between federal securities laws and state corporate law
duties before Sarbanes Oxley, including how securities law incorporated ﬁduciary duty
concepts, see D.C. Langevoort, ‘The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability’ (2001) 89 Georgetown
Law Journal, 797. For scholarly debate on the ‘federalization’ of corporate governance via
the Sarbanes Oxley Act, see sources at n. 1 above.
15 USC § 7241(a)(4)–(6) (2008) (requiring that the SEC pass regulations requiring
certiﬁcations from executives on internal controls).
15 USC § 7262 (2008) (requiring that the SEC pass regulations specifying information in the
required, the reports). See also 17 CFR §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274 (2007) (SEC
rules responding to statutory mandate under ss 302 and 404).
‘Sarbanes Oxley: Five Years Under the Thumb’ (26 July 2007) Economist.
E.g. 17 CFR § 205 (2007) (setting standards for conduct for attorneys appearing before the
SEC).
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Although the above provisions generally relate directly to ﬁnancial disclosure,
legal risks beyond ﬁnancial fraud impact a company’s ﬁnancial reporting, and thus
these laws and regulations can improve the ﬂow of information to the board on legal
compliance in general.

7.5

CONCLUDING ANALYSIS

Whether corporate or securities law create optimal incentives for directors to
monitor misconduct represents one of the most intense areas of scholarly and policy
debate in US business law. This debate mirrors the questions posed earlier in Part 7
on the impact of veil piercing, direct participation and responsible corporate ofﬁcer
standards on director behaviour. Again, the effects of different director liability rules
on optimal monitoring and deterrence of corporate misconduct, risk-spreading,
decision-making and delegation of decisions, and the market for directors remain
open to empirical study. It may be extremely optimistic to expect conclusive answers
to any of these questions in the near future.
Yet, it is striking that the phrasing of these questions, the structure of director
liability rules in this chapter, and the way courts talk about these rules reﬂect
certain values embedded both in US corporate law and in the way corporate law
intersects with public law. Efﬁciency concerns take centre stage, and particularly
concerns about efﬁciency within the corporation. Shareholders occupy a privileged
position in American law. Indeed, scholars have long remarked how corporate
limited liability represents a form of subsidy paid by tort creditors to shareholders
to encourage capital formation.163 So too does the rule structure that makes liability
of directors for corporate misconduct relatively rare, a representation of an implicit
high valuation of the economic activity generated by the corporate form compared
to the costs borne by the public from torts and violations of environmental and other
public laws.

163 L. Ribstein, ‘Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation’ (1991) 50 Maryland Law

Review, 80, 94 (describing this as the ‘externalities hypothesis’).

